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ARGUMENT 
Utah should not cast out thirty years of precedent by removing the 
requirement that an incarcerated person needs to be within distinct 
boundaries to be considered incarcerated in a place of legal 
confinement. The court assumes that "the legislature uses each term 
[in a statute] advisedly and gives effect to each term according to its 
accepted meaning." See Pace v. St. George City Police Dept. 2006 UT 
App. 496, TJ6, 153 P.3d 789 (finding a person under arrest, restrained 
and escorted to a restroom in the police station was under police 
control) and State v. Germonto, 2003 UT App. gl7, If 7, 73 P.3d 978. 
(Finding a prisoner who had not left the confines ofv h p ™ i s°n could not 
be convicted of escape). 
The Immunity Act retains the State's sovereign imnf111111^ t r o m 
suit when an injury "arises out of, in connection with, or results l r ^ m " 
. the incarceration of any persons in any . . . place of lega^ 
confinement." Utah Code Ann. 63G-7-301(5)(j)(emphasis added). The 
plain language of this section requires that an incarcerated person 
would necessarily need to be "in" a "place of legal confinement" at the 
1 
time the negligence arises from which the government tries to assert its 
immunity. Id. 
In each and every case the touchstones of the incarcerate 
exception have been applied to a person 1) restrained to a definitive 
location with distinct boundaries and 2) under the control of the state. 
See Madsen v. State, 583 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah 1978)(finding the 
incarceration exception applied to a person "m prison and under the 
control of the State"); and all of its progeny, (each finding that the 
incarcerated person was in a distinct location and under state control, 
as discussed more fully in Ms. Whitney Opening Brief pp 16-17). 
The accepted meaning of legal confinement as defined by the Utah 
Court of Appeals is
 a place with distinct boundaries. Germonto, 2003 
UT App. 217, a t ^|io. Central to the Germonto opinion was the 
definition of j e g a i confinement. Id. The court determining; "any place 
w e r e
 a person is legally confined must necessarily be a place with 
P .lysical barriers where the person is actually confined." Id at f^ 10. 
In the present case, Dillon Whitney was in a community-based 
placement without any boundaries and was provided with a bus pass so 
2 
that he could go anywhere he chose in or even out of the city.1 Dillon 
was not confined within any distinct boundaries. The State's entire 
argument in its Opening Brief rests upon the idea that "a place of legal 
confinement" does not have to have any boundaries. 
Specifically, what the State asserted was that the "[Governmental 
Immunity] Act does not require actual confinement. Instead, the State 
is protected from injuries connected to legal confinement.'" (see Applt's 
Opening Brief at p. 12). The State goes on to claim that the "touchstone 
of incarceration is being 'under the control of the state' [misquoting 
Madsen v. State by leaving off the preceding passage, 'in prison and:] 
and unable to be released without some kind of permission." See Id at 
p. 13, and Madsen, 583 P.2d at 93. Such a distinction w o u l d l e a d t o t h e 
absurd rule that a person (meaning everyone) who is v 4 n d e r t n e c o n t r o 
of the government (as is everyone), who is voluntary v m 
1
 The order placing Dillon Whitney in the community-based placemen^ 
had absolutely no restrictions on places Dillon could go. It only 
restricted whom Dillon could visit; specifically he was not allowed to 
have contact with Kaden Casey and Lorenzo Gallegos. 
2
 The incarceration exception does not differentiate whether the person 
voluntarily committed himself or herself to the place of confinement or 
if they were involuntarily committed. Emery v. State, 483 P.2d 1296, 
1297 (Utah 1971). (Finding a patient who voluntarily committed herself 
to a specific place, the state mental hospital was incarcerated). 
3 
community (as fits most everyone) would meet the description of a 
person incarcerated in a place of legal confinement. 
Prisoners, inmates, mentally ill persons, and/or incarcerated 
persons are released into the community, not out of the community. 
Additionally, the State's proposed rule would include everyone in the 
community as everyone is under the control of the state to some degree. 
For example, children in foster care are wards of the State and 
therefore are under the control of the State and would be considered 
incarcerated. This Court previously determined that a child in foster 
care could sue the State for their negligent placement. See Little v. 
Division of Family Services, 677 P.2d 49, 50-52 (Utah 1983). (See 
Applee's Brief, EquaJf Protection of the Laws Sec. and Open Court Sec, 
pp 19-23). Furthermore, children who are subjected to curfew laws are 
considered ijj^der the control of the State and would be considered 
m c a r c r i ; rated, as would their parents. In particular, see Salt Lake City, 
Ordinance 11.44.070 (2011) that provides: 
CURFEW FOR MINORS: 
A. It is unlawful for any minor under sixteen (16) years of 
age to remain or loiter on any of the sidewalks, streets, 
alleys or public places in the city between eleven o'clock 
(11:00) P.M. and five o'clock (5:00) A.M. the following 
4 
morning. 
B. It is unlawful for any minor under eighteen (18) years of 
age to remain or loiter on any of the sidewalks, streets, 
alleys or public places in the city between one o'clock (1:00) 
A.M. and five o'clock (5:00) A.M. the following morning. 
C. It is unlawful for any parent, guardian or other person 
having legal care and custody of any minor dealt with 
respectively in subsections A and B of this section to 
knowingly allow or permit any such minor to remain or 
loiter on any of the sidewalks, streets, alleys or public places 
in the city, within the times provided in subsections A and B, 
respectively, of this section, except as provided in subsection 
D of this section. 
Further examples would include any adult who has a restraining 
order placed against them, as they are again tinder the control of the 
state and would be considered incarcerated. Jpstanding citizens 
frequently subject themselves to the control of the s t a t e a n d would be 
considered incarcerated when: they get in a car tb^ r e D y subjecting 
themselves to the Motor Vehicle Act; they work and are subjp c t e (* t o t n e 
Tax Code; they obtain a license to practice a profession thus subje>c^m§ 
themselves to the control of the Division of Professional Licensing along 
with the laws of the state. Most would take offense to learn that the 
State considers them incarcerated. 
5 
Simply put, if the only requirement were that a person is "under 
the control of the State" and the place of legal confinement does not 
have distinct boundaries, it would be overly broad and include everyone. 
The legislature could not intend that a person "in a place of legal 
confinement" would include a child, like Dillon, to be considered 
incarcerated when he had free run in and beyond the Salt Lake 
community. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should affirm the district court of Utah's holding that a 
child in the community is not incarcerated. Ms. Whitney, therefore, 
respectfully requests tfrat the Supreme Court of Utah find in her favor 
by confirming thirty
 y e a r s of precedent and that the Governmental 
Immunity Act doe
 s n o t apply to Dillon Whitney. 
Respec; t f u l l y submitted this 18th day of July 2011. 
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